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Received evidence suggests that changes in appointer- and overseer-
preferences inﬂuence monetary policy (i.e., partisan heritage matters).
Evidence presented here, on the other hand, is consistent with changes in
the cost of pursuing a common preference inﬂuencing policy. I draw this
evidence from a panel of Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) votes
and ﬁnd support for the following conclusions: (1) Federal Reserve Board
(FRB) governors who were nominated and conﬁrmed by the same party
(Republican or Democrat) prefer signiﬁcantly looser policy than do other
FOMC members. (2) Monetary policy is signiﬁcantly looser when either
party controls the oversight mechanism (i.e., the presidency and Senate)
than when control is split. (3) Oversight acts less forcefully on district bank
presidents than on FRB governors. In short, the present evidence suggests
that political agents from both parties prefer loose money and pursue this
preference more efﬁciently when their parties are aligned.
1. Introduction
The political economy of the Federal Reserve System is an extensively
researched topic. Consequently, contributors to the literature have “estab-
lished” several results about how political forces inﬂuence U.S. monetary
policy. One such result suggests that “partisan heritage” inﬂuences policy
through appointments and oversight—that is, Democrats induce looser pol-
icy than do Republicans.
Evidence on which this result rests, however, appears problematic. First,
while relevant political agents
1 (e.g., the president and Senate) can exercise
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1. Throughout the article I refer to presidents/Senates as “political agents” to recognize their
relationship with associated constituent-principals. One goal of the present research is to improve
our understanding of how institutions inﬂuence agency-costs within this relationship. While
presidents/Senates employ their own agents (e.g., central bankers), I view any such employment
as a component of this more encompassing principal-agency relationship.
 2002 Oxford University PressDoes Partisan Heritage Matter? 489
inﬂuence jointly, received evidence rests on the assumption that agents act
independently. Second, while appointments and oversight can simultaneously
inﬂuence policy, received evidence rests on the assumption that only one or
the other is empirically relevant.
I address these difﬁculties by formally examining a panel of Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC) votes. The resulting evidence is robust and sup-
ports conclusions that depart markedly from those in the literature.
1. Federal Reserve Board (FRB) governors who were nominated and con-
ﬁrmed by the same party (Democrat or Republican) prefer signiﬁcantly
looser monetary policy than do any other FOMC members.
2. Monetary policy is signiﬁcantly looser when either party controls the
oversight mechanism (i.e., the presidency and Senate) than when control
is split.
3. Oversight acts less forcefully on district bank presidents than on FRB
governors.
In short, the present evidence suggests that political agents from both parties
prefer loose money and face lower costs to act on this common preference
when their parties are aligned.
2
In addition to improving our understanding of how political forces inﬂu-
ence U.S. monetary policy, these results provide insight to a more gen-
eral phenomenon; namely, how formal institutions constrain political agents.
Since at least Kydland and Prescott’s (1977) seminal contribution, social
scientists have recognized the potential for time inconsistency to induce
suboptimal equilibria. One mechanism for checking this problem is dele-
gation to disinterested authorities (Schelling, 1960). A necessary condition
for effective delegation, however, is durability. An interesting question for
political economists thus becomes: What constrains political agents from
circumventing potentially efﬁciency-enhancing delegation?
The Federal Reserve System (the Fed) offers a natural laboratory in which
to address this question. By delegating authority over monetary policy,
Congress potentially checked its ability to pursue time-inconsistent policies.
But what constrains Congress from circumventing this delegation?
Evidence that I report here suggests that identiﬁable features of the Fed’s
institutional structure strengthen these constraints. For example, the present
evidence suggests that having the Senate conﬁrm presidential nominations
signiﬁcantly constrains political agents from manipulating policy via appoint-
ments. In addition, it suggests this constraint is stronger when different par-
ties control the presidency and Senate. This insight cannot be drawn from
contributions that ignore the potential for presidents and Senates to jointly
inﬂuence policy.
2. The relatively rich set of punishment strategies available to players from the same party
may reduce this cost. When these strategies are not feasible, as may be the case when players
come from different parties, cooperative outcomes may not be sustainable, even if the players’
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The present evidence also suggests that placing district bank presidents on
the FOMC signiﬁcantly constrains political agents from manipulating policy
via oversight. Like the constraint on appointments, this one appears to be
stronger when different parties control the presidency and Senate. This insight
cannot be drawn, however, from contributions that ignore the potential for
appointments and oversight to simultaneously inﬂuence monetary policy.
In short, the present evidence is consistent with changes in the cost of
political agents pursuing a common objective, not changes in preferences
over corresponding outcomes, inﬂuencing policy. This distinction is impor-
tant because costs are sensitive to identiﬁable features of relevant institutional
structures that, in principal, can be altered to improve associated political out-
comes. Preference-based explanations, on the other hand, are difﬁcult (if not
impossible) to refute and lack normative prescriptions.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2 I
explicate those features of the Federal Reserve System that are important
for the present research and critically review contributions to the literature.
In Section 3 I formally identify how unobservable political forces, acting
through appointments and oversight, can reveal themselves in FOMC voting.
In Section 4 I apply this identiﬁcation to interpret a panel of FOMC votes.
Finally, I conclude in Section 5.
2. Appointments and Oversight as Potential Channels
for Political Inﬂuence
In this section I describe how interested political agents can inﬂuence mon-
etary policy through appointments and oversight. I then review contributions
to the literature that identify partisan forces as acting through these channels.
3
I conclude the section by highlighting difﬁculties with this inference.
2.1 Channels for Inﬂuence
2.1.1 Formal Structure of the Federal Reserve System. The Federal Reserve
System includes 12 district banks and the Federal Reserve Board (FRB). Each
bank has a president who is nominated by the district’s board of directors
and approved by the FRB to a renewable ﬁve-year term.
4 The FRB has
3. Because this literature is extensive, my review necessarily excludes many important con-
tributions. Nevertheless, I believe that the contributions reviewed here accurately represent the
literature’s progress. While I take issue with the state of this literature, I do so respectfully
because it is frequently easier to criticize received theories than to create new ones.
4. Each district bank has a board of nine outside directors. Three of these board members
are class A directors who are afﬁliated with Federal Reserve System member banks and elected
to their respective boards by these banks. In addition, three members are class B directors who,
like class A directors, are elected to the board by member banks. However, class B directors are
not afﬁliated with the Federal Reserve System (i.e., they are not ofﬁcers, directors, or employees
of member banks). Finally, three members are class C directors who, like class B directors, are
chosen from the public. In addition, class C directors cannot be stockholders of a bank and
are not elected to their respective boards by member banks. Instead, the FRB appoints class
C directors, designating one as the board’s chair and another as the deputy chair (Havrilesky,
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seven governors who are appointed by the president and conﬁrmed by the
Senate to nonrenewable 14-year terms.
5 On a rotating basis, four district bank
presidents combine with all seven FRB governors and the New York district
president to make up the Federal Open Markets Committee (FOMC), the
policy-making center of the Federal Reserve System.
The FOMC meets approximately eight times a year to devise open mar-
ket operations, the most important tool for implementing monetary policy. At
each meeting the FOMC ofﬁcially deﬁnes its position by agreeing to a policy
directive. Agreement is formally reached when a simple majority of FOMC
members vote to adopt a proposed directive. Following such agreement, the
FOMC shares its directive with the Domestic Manager of the System Open
Market Account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York who then imple-
ments the agreed upon policy (Havrilesky, 1995:5).
2.1.2 Lack of Familiar Constraints. A lack of familiar bureaucratic controls
is frequently cited as insulating the Fed from political inﬂuence. For instance,
throughout its history, the Fed has not received a Congressional appropria-
tion. Instead, it ﬁnances its operations with interest on a portfolio of govern-
ment securities, which it accumulates through open market operations (Toma,
1986). In addition, if appointed to a full 14-year term, a board member is
not eligible for reappointment; only members who complete unexpired terms
can be reappointed (Friedman, 1986:28).
6 Finally, board members cannot be
ﬁred, forced to resign, or voted out of ofﬁce (Waller, 1992:415).
2.1.3 Potentially Inﬂuential Mechanisms: Appointments and Oversight.
Despite this apparent insulation, channels exist through which interested
actors may inﬂuence monetary policy. For example, although FRB gov-
ernors are seldom swayed by the prospect of reappointment, the original
appointment process may be inﬂuential.
In addition, while conventional oversight methods (e.g., budget appropria-
tions) are unavailable to the Fed’s overseers, interested political agents appear
to have alternative channels. The FRB chair represents one such channel.
Unlike other FRB members, the chair testiﬁes before Congress and faces
reappointment (i.e., to the chair, not the FOMC). As a result, he may be
more sensitive to oversight than are other FOMC members. In turn, the chair
potentially inﬂuences FOMC members by building consensus as an internal
allocator of resources (Chappell, Havrilesky, and McGregor, 1993:191). The
chair thus appears to be an important “conduit” for political forces acting
through oversight.
7
5. One governor’s term expires every other January. Governors must come from different
Federal Reserve Districts so that no region is overrepresented. The FRB’s chair is chosen from
among the seven governors and serves a four-year renewable term (Havrilesky, 1995:3–4).
6. On the other hand, district bank presidents may be reappointed, even after serving a full
ﬁve-year term.
7. The manner in which the chair acts as this conduit, in turn, suggests that oversight can
induce observable changes in FOMC voting behavior. I formally establish this implication in
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2.2 Received Evidence Regarding Appointment and Oversight Inﬂuence
This unique institutional structure has led scholars to focus on a relatively
small set of questions.
1. Do strategic appointments of FRB governors inﬂuence monetary policy?
2. Does the process through which FRB governors are appointed impose
different forces on monetary policy than does the process through which
district bank presidents are appointed?
8
3. Following the appointment process, does oversight inﬂuence monetary
policy?
Evidence exists that strategic appointments inﬂuence monetary policy and
that partisan forces drive this inﬂuence.
9 For example, Chappell, Havrilesky,
and McGregor (1993:187) examine whether FOMC members are “directly
inﬂuenced by the partisan ideology of the current President, and whether
they systematically differ according to the party of the President who
appointed them” (emphasis in original).
10 Their results suggest that supply-
side (i.e., Reagan) appointees prefer signiﬁcantly lower Fed funds rates
(i.e., looser monetary policy) than do Democrat appointees who, in turn,
prefer signiﬁcantly lower rates than do “traditional” Republican appointees
(Chappell, Havrilesky, and McGregor, 1993:199). In other words, Chappell,
Havrilesky, and McGregor’s evidence is consistent with Reagan appointees
being the most liberal FRB governors and other Republican appointees being
the most conservative. The authors interpret this result as being consistent
with appointments providing “an important channel of systematic partisan
inﬂuence” (Chappell, Havrilesky, and McGregor, 1993:209, emphasis added).
Evidence also exists that the mechanism for selecting FRB governors
produces different political forces than does the mechanism for selecting
district bank presidents. For example, Chappell, Havrilesky, and McGregor
(1993:202) interpret their data as being consistent with FRB governors pre-
ferring looser policy than do district bank presidents.
8. Answers to this question have immediate policy applications in light of recent proposals
to either remove voting rights from district bank presidents or bring the appointment of district
presidents under more direct control of Congress and the executive (e.g., see Keech and Morris,
1997:262).
9. See Keech and Morris (1997:254) for a review of contributions that identify “appointment
power as a central mechanism of presidential inﬂuence of the Fed.” See Chappell, Havrilesky,
and McGregor (1993:186) for a review of contributions that identify a president’s party as
affecting the appointment process.
10. Chappell, Havrilesky, and McGregor (1993) simultaneously examine appointment and
oversight inﬂuence by estimating reaction functions for individual FOMC members across time.
They use a two-stage process to ﬁrst estimate each individual’s preferred policy (i.e., target Fed
funds rate) and then the relationship between this preference and appointments and oversight.
In this manner they assess the relationship between a member’s ideal point, the party of his
or her appointing president, and the party of his or her overseeing president. Keech and Mor-
ris (1997:254) suggest that Chappell, Havrilesky, and McGregor provide “the most complete
investigation of the possibility that presidents inﬂuence monetary policy through the power of
appointment.” Nevertheless, Chappell, Havrilesky, and McGregor do not address the potential
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Tootell (1996), on the other hand, argues that differences in partisan
heritage, not between FRB governors and district bank presidents, induce
variation in FOMC voting.
11 He argues that, since the FRB must approve
nominations of district bank presidents, appointments of district presidents
should be no less political than those of FRB governors (Tootell, 1996:192).
12
For Tootell (1996:193), “(w)hether bank presidents are more conservative
than board governors depends on whether presidents are more likely than
governors to be Republicans.”
Finally, evidence exists that partisan forces also inﬂuence monetary pol-
icy via oversight. For example, Caporale and Grier (1998) examine whether
changes in the real Fed funds rate are associated with changes in overseer
preferences (e.g., those of the president and leaders of relevant congressional
committees).
13 Caporale and Grier (1998:423) ﬁnd evidence that oversight by
Republican presidents and relatively conservative Senate Banking Committee
leadership is associated with tighter monetary policy.
14 Hibbs (1986) offers
early evidence in this spirit.
In short, evidence exists (though it is mixed) that (i) political forces inﬂu-
ence monetary policy through appointments, (ii) mechanisms through which
FRB governors and district bank presidents are selected create different inﬂu-
ences on monetary policy, and (iii) political forces inﬂuence monetary policy
via oversight. While contributors to the literature disagree about the channels
through which political forces act on monetary policy, they tend to agree that
such forces vary systematically with the party of relevant political agents (i.e.,
partisan heritage matters).
2.3 Potential Difﬁculties with Received Evidence
Evidence on which these conclusions rest faces at least two difﬁculties.
First, contributors tend to examine how appointments or oversight inﬂuence
11. To evaluate this conjecture, Tootell (1996) separately estimates reduced form reaction
functions for governors and district presidents. He uses a similar method to evaluate differences
in voting behavior between Democrat and Republican appointees. Evaluated in this manner, his
data are consistent with reaction functions that do not differ between FRB governors and district
bank presidents (Tootell, 1996:195). He concludes that “(p)artisan afﬁliation seems to play some
role in FOMC voting” (Tootell, 1996:204). However, Tootell’s examination does not control for
the simultaneous inﬂuence that oversight has on FOMC voting. In addition, it does not control
for the inﬂuence that interactions between the president and Senate might have on how political
forces act on monetary policy.
12. For Tootell’s argument to be valid, outcomes of the “appointment game” must be robust
to its extensive form representation.
13. The authors distinguish presidents by party and members of Congress by average Amer-
icans for Democratic Action (ADA) scores over the period in which they held a committee
leadership position. They do not, however, investigate how interactions between the president
and Congress might inﬂuence the ability to exercise oversight. In addition, because they exam-
ine time series data, they cannot control for how the appointment process might inﬂuence over-
sight’s effectiveness and direction. I address these sources of potential bias both theoretically
(see Section 3.2) and empirically (e.g., see Table 8).
14. Chappell, Havrilesky, and McGregor (1993) on the other hand, present evidence that is
inconsistent with oversight signiﬁcantly inﬂuencing monetary policy. Unlike Caporale and Grier,
however, they do not address the potential for Congress to exert inﬂuence via oversight.494 The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, V18 N2
monetary policy.
15 Since political agents frequently oversee the same FOMC
members that they appointed, inferences that can be drawn from such studies
potentially confound inﬂuence that acts through these channels simultane-
ously. I address this difﬁculty by examining a panel of FOMC votes.
16 By
evaluating cross-sectional and time-series variation together, I can measure
the independent inﬂuence of appointments and oversight, respectively.
Second, contributors tend to ignore institutionally deﬁned interactions
between relevant players.
17 For example, while the Senate conﬁrms pres-
idential nominations, contributors to the literature frequently employ only
the president’s party to measure the inﬂuence acting through appointments.
I address this difﬁculty by partitioning appointers in a manner that identiﬁes
the nominating president and conﬁrming Senate. Doing so facilitates my
evaluation of whether the president inﬂuences appointments alone or does
so jointly with the Senate.
Inferences that can be drawn from the literature (i.e., partisan heritage
matters) appear sensitive to these difﬁculties. For example, when I ignore
the joint inﬂuence of presidents and Senates, the inference from my FOMC
voting data is consistent with conclusions in the literature—partisan heritage
matters. When I account for this joint inﬂuence, however, I produce evidence
that Democrats and Republicans exercise inﬂuence identically—partisan her-
itage does not matter. Before turning to this evidence in Section 4, I estab-
lish in Section 3 the manner in which political forces can make themselves
observable in FOMC votes.
3. Observable Implications of Appointments and Oversight
In Section 2 I critically review received conclusions and argue that infer-
ence from a panel of FOMC votes is potentially more valid. To facilitate
this inference, I illustrate in the present section how appointment and over-
sight forces can make themselves observable in FOMC voting. I do so in a
relatively simple manner; namely, by synthesizing theoretical insights about
coalition formation and Chappell, Havrilesky, and McGregor’s (1993) for-
mal characterization of FOMC voting behavior. By taking this approach, I
attempt to strengthen conclusions that are available from the present data—
these conclusions depart markedly from those in the literature, but emerge
from an analytical framework that earlier contributors have, in large part,
already adopted.
15. Because contributors frequently examine either time-series or cross-sectional data, they
can only evaluate how changes in oversight or appointments, respectively, inﬂuence monetary
policy. Chappell, Havrilesky, and McGregor (1993) are an important exception to this general-
ization. However, they do not evaluate how interactions between the president and Senate might
inﬂuence the appointment and oversight processes.
16. Tootell (1996) also evaluates voting data, but only considers the potential for appoint-
ments to inﬂuence monetary policy. In addition, he does not investigate the potential for presi-
dents and Senates to jointly inﬂuence appointments.
17. Theoretical results regarding the nonneutrality of hierarchies (and thus the sensitivity of
bureaucratic decisions to institutional structures) emphasize the importance of addressing this
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Chappell, Havrilesky, and McGregor (1993) offer a comprehensive
account of how the FOMC develops policy directives. In short, they argue
that homogenizing forces induce FOMC members to dissent from proposed
directives only if the distances between ideal points x∗ and proposals xP
exceed a threshold  .
18 Stated more precisely, they identify the following
conditions as governing FOMC voting.
Members dissent in favor of looser policy if x
∗−x
P < −  (1.1)
Members assent if −  ≤ x
∗−x
P ≤   (1.2)
Members dissent in favor of tighter policy if x
∗−x
P >  (1.3)
In a relatively straightforward manner, Equations (1.1)–(1.3) imply that
“tight” or “loose” political agents appoint FOMC members who dissent more
frequently, ceteris paribus, in the same direction. Coupled with theoretical
insights about coalition formation, these conditions also imply that relatively
tight or loose overseers induce FOMC members to dissent more frequently,
ceteris paribus, in the opposite direction.
I develop these observable implications more carefully by letting
x
∗   a  b  
2 →  a b  (2)
govern the formation of ideal points x∗ in Equations (1.1)–(1.3). I also let
x∗ increase in each of its arguments where elements of the ordered pair
 xA
i  xO
t   ∈  a b 2 represent the ideal points of FOMC member i’s appointer
and period t’s overseer, respectively. Finally, I interpret leftward (rightward)
movements on  a b  as preferences for looser (tighter) monetary policy.
3.1 Observable Implications of Appointments
To see how appointments inﬂuence FOMC voting, suppose that member i’s
appointer prefers looser policy than does member j’s (i.e., xA
i <x A
j ). Since x∗
increases in its ﬁrst argument and contemporaneous members face overseers
with the same ideal points, member i must prefer looser policy than does j
(i.e., x∗ xA
i  xO
t  <x ∗ xA
j  xO
t  ). In turn, x∗ xA
i  xO
t  −xP




follows from Equations (1.1)–(1.3) that member i dissents for looser policy
with (weakly) higher probability than does member j (and vice versa for
tighter policy). Since this argument holds for any two FOMC members, its
conclusion can be stated more generally as follows.
Proposition 1. Political agents who prefer relatively tight or loose mone-
tary policy appoint FOMC members who, ceteris paribus, dissent with higher
probability in the same direction.
18. This phenomenon is evident, for example, in a statement by Alfred Hayes (a former New
York district bank president) who “was reluctant to vote afﬁrmatively because he was dissatisﬁed
with the proposed course. He planned to do so, however, because the difference of view was not
sufﬁciently great to warrant his casting a dissenting vote” (Chappell, Havrilesky, and McGregor,
1993:192). Chappell, Havrilesky, and McGregor (1993:192, note 13) offer additional anecdotal
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3.2 Observable Implications of Oversight
Proposition 1 says that attempts to inﬂuence monetary policy via appoint-
ments can increase observed dissents in the same direction. The opposite
observable implication emerges when political agents inﬂuence policy via
oversight—dissenting behavior is negatively related to the direction in which
overseers inﬂuence policy.
Suppose that overseer preferences change from xO
t to xO
t+1 and, without
loss of generality, let xO
t+1 <x O
t (i.e., the new overseer prefers looser policy).
Since FOMC member ideal points increase in each of their arguments, and
the ﬁrst argument (i.e., the appointer’s ideal point) is constant across time, it
follows that x∗ xA
i  xO
t+1 <x ∗ xA
i  xO
t   ∀i. In other words, each FOMC mem-
ber prefers looser policy under period t+1’s oversight than under period t’s
oversight. Hence, because the FOMC’s collective choice rule (i.e., major-
ity rule) satisﬁes the condition of unanimity, ceteris paribus, the equilibrium
policy directive must also shift leftward; that is, xP
t+1 <x P
t . The question of
present interest is whether such a shift creates observable responses in FOMC
voting.
For oversight to create observable responses, it must (by Equations
(1.1)–(1.3)) change the distance between FOMC member ideal points and
equilibrium policy directives for at least one member (i.e., ∃i such that
 x∗ xA
i  xO
t   − xP
t    =  x∗ xA
i  xO
t+1  − xP
t+1 ). A sufﬁcient condition for this
change is for oversight to be sensitive to appointer ideal points (i.e., Equa-
tion (2) satisﬁes  / xA
i   x∗/ xO
t    = 0). Under this condition, the magnitude
of  x∗/ xO
t differs across members i because appointer ideal points differ
(e.g.,  x∗/ xO
t  xA
i  =  x∗/ xO
t  xA
j ). Consequently  x∗ xA
i  xO
t  −xP
t   does not,
in general, equal  x∗ xA
i  xO
t+1  − xP
t+1  for all i. Coupled with Equations
(1.1)–(1.3), the condition  / xA
i   x∗/ xO
t    = 0 thus implies that oversight
can change FOMC voting behavior and thus provide information about how
oversight inﬂuences monetary policy.
Hence, to establish that FOMC voting reveals inﬂuence via oversight, I
show that  / xA
i   x∗/ xO
t    = 0 is an empirically relevant condition. Recall
from Section 2 that overseers can exert inﬂuence on the Fed chair. The chair,
in turn, can inﬂuence policy directives via his positions as policy proposer
and allocator of internal resources. The manner in which the chair acts as
this conduit can reveal overseers’ preferences.
If the cost of suppressing dissents increases with the difference
 x∗ xA
i  xO
t   − xP
t  −  in Equations (1.1)–(1.3), then a cost-minimizing
chair responds to oversight by lobbying only those members who marginally
oppose the overseer’s inﬂuence.
19 Consequently, ideal points for “extreme”
members (i.e., members for whom  x∗ xA
i  xO
t  −xP
t  −    0) are relatively
insensitive to changes in overseer preferences. Stated more formally, the
magnitude of  x∗/ xO
t increases as  x∗ xA
i  xO
t  −xP
t  −  → 0+ ∀t and thus
 / xA
i   x∗ xO
t   does not equal zero.
19. Riker (1962) offers an early argument in this spirit.Does Partisan Heritage Matter? 497
Under these conditions, oversight leaves extreme opposers’ ideal points
unchanged while shifting policy proposals away from them. Equations (1.1)–
(1.3) therefore imply that an overseer’s attempt to loosen monetary policy
(weakly) increases dissents for tighter policy. The symmetric implication
obtains for attempts to tighten policy. I state this implication more generally
as follows.
Proposition 2. Overseers who prefer relatively tight or loose monetary
policy, ceteris paribus, increase the probability with which FOMC members
dissent in the opposite direction.
4. Empirical Analysis
4.1 An Estimable Model
Propositions 1 and 2 identify how political forces, acting through appoint-
ments and oversight, can create observable inﬂuences on FOMC voting. I
employ these insights in this section to interpret evidence from a panel of
FOMC votes.
This evidence emerges from my estimates of the following model:
yit = f x 1 i x 2 t x 3 t u  (3)
where
yit measures the voting behavior of FOMC member i in year t;
x1 i denotes a vector of dummy variables characterizing FOMC member
i’s appointer;
x2 t denotes a vector of dummy variables characterizing each FOMC mem-
ber’s oversight environment in year t;
x3 t denotes a vector of variables that control for unmodeled forces that
might inﬂuence each FOMC member’s voting behavior in period t; and
u is an error term.
20
4.2 Data
4.2.1 Dependent Variables. To mitigate the potential for structural changes
in the data’s generation, I draw my sample from the post-gold-standard period
1973-1997.
21 In addition, to facilitate checks of robustness, I employ two
different dependent variables to estimate Equation (3). The ﬁrst reﬂects the
frequency with which an FOMC member dissented and the second identiﬁes
whether a member dissented. Information that is necessary to construct these
variables appears in the Federal Reserve Bulletin.
20. Note that the error term u does not vary across individuals or time. I control for variation
in these error components via the appointer and overseer dummies, respectively.
21. The length of this sample is comparable to that of other contributions. For example,
Chappell et al. (1993) examine data from FOMC meetings during 1960–1987, Krause (1994)
examines data from FOMC meetings during 1967–1990, Tootell (1996) examines data from
FOMC meetings during 1965–1986, and Caporale and Grier (1998) examine a time series of
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Table 1. Continuous Dependent Variable (Voting Score)
Description N Mean SD Min Max
The percentage of times an FOMC 259 0.02 0.15 −0 45 0.63
member dissented for tighter (positive
values) or looser (negative values)
policy in a given year
To construct the ﬁrst variable (i.e., voting score) I assigned a value of −1
to members who voted for looser policy than was proposed in a meeting’s
directive. Similarly I assigned a value of 0 to members who voted for a
meeting’s directive (i.e., those who did not dissent) and +1 to those who
voted for tighter policy. For each year in which an FOMC member voted in
at least half of the meetings, I calculated that member’s voting score as the
average of his or her votes. Hence each member’s voting score is continuous
on  −1 1  and equals the percentage of times that he or she dissented for
looser (negative scores) or tighter (positive scores) policy.
22 Table 1 describes
this variable’s distribution.
To construct the second dependent variable (i.e., group), I assigned each
member who dissented at least once for looser policy in a particular year to
group 1. Similarly, I assigned to groups 2 and 3, respectively, members who
did not dissent and dissented at least once for tighter policy. Consequently,
group is a polychotomous variable that identiﬁes whether an individual mem-
ber dissented (and, if so, how) in a particular year. Table 2 describes this
variable’s distribution.
By employing this alternative measure, I attempt control for unmodeled
and persistent shocks that might inﬂate the magnitude of estimates under
the dependent variable voting score. Such a bias could emerge if a persis-
tent shock increased the frequency with which FOMC members dissent and
coincided with changes in appointments or oversight. While group is a rel-
atively coarse measure of voting behavior, and thus reduces the efﬁciency
with which I can estimate Equation (3)’s parameters, its magnitude is robust
to the persistence of unmodeled shocks. Associated parameter estimates are
thus less susceptible to bias.
4.2.2 Independent Variables—Appointments and Oversight. To measure
appointment inﬂuence, I partition FOMC members into several subsets (not
necessarily disjoint). In addition to partitions considered in the literature, the
present partitions include those that recognize the potential for presidents
and Senates to jointly inﬂuence appointments. Variables described in Table 3
deﬁne these partitions.
To measure the inﬂuence of oversight, I partition the data’s time-series
dimension into several subsets (not necessarily disjoint). Like those for
22. No members dissented for both tighter and looser policy in a given year.Does Partisan Heritage Matter? 499
Table 2. Polychotomous Dependent Variable (Group)
Group Description N
1 FOMC members who dissented for looser policy in a given year 53
2 FOMC members who did not dissent in a given year 143
3 FOMC members who dissented for tighter policy in a given year 63
Total 259
appointments, these partitions extend measures from the literature by
controlling for the joint inﬂuence of presidents and Senates.
23 Variables
described in Table 4 deﬁne these partitions.
24
By employing the proxies described in Tables 3 and 4, I can evaluate
political inﬂuence on monetary policy within the context of received contri-
butions and by controlling for the joint inﬂuence of relevant political agents.
For example, by employing a partition that only distinguishes FRB gover-
nors from district bank presidents, I can examine the present data in a manner
similar to that employed in the literature. On the other hand, by employing a
ﬁner partition (e.g., one that identiﬁes FRB governors who were nominated
and conﬁrmed by the same party), I can explicitly address the potential for
presidents and Senates to jointly exert inﬂuence.
4.2.3 Independent Variables—Other Controls. In developing Propositions 1
and 2, I implicitly assume that only political forces inﬂuence FOMC voting.
Economic forces may also exert inﬂuence, however. To check the poten-
tial for associated omitted-variable bias, I include a measure of inﬂation in
Equation (3)’s regressors. Information in Table 5 summarizes this variable’s
distribution.
Finally, I include the time-trend variable YEAR as a regressor. In doing so,
I control for unmodeled forces that vary with time but not across individuals.
4.3 Empirical Methods
I estimate Equation (3) using two different measures of FOMC voting behav-
ior: one continuous (i.e., voting score) and the other discontinuous (i.e.,
group). Under the discontinuous measure, the relationship f in Equation (3)
is clearly nonlinear. The multinomial logit model yields valid parameter esti-
mates for this pattern of nonlinearity when choices are independent of irrele-
vant alternatives. Since FOMC members do not chose from close substitutes,
23. Caporale and Grier (1998) present evidence that the Senate, but not the House, exerts
signiﬁcant inﬂuence via oversight. To facilitate comparability of the present and received results,
I restrict my attention to interaction between the president and Senate.
24. Since these proxies reﬂect the potential for political agents to exercise oversight capabil-
ities, they provide a more fundamental measure of relevant political forces than would proxies
for actual oversight (e.g., number of oversight hearings).500 The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, V18 N2
Table 3. Independent Variables—Appointments
Variable Description Mean
APPTFRB Equals one for FRB governors 0.53
APPTDIST Equals one for district bank presidents 0.47
APPTDEM Equals one for FRB governors nominated by a Democrat 0.13
APPTREP Equals one for FRB governors nominated by a Republican 0.40
APPTREP2 Equals one for FRB governors nominated by a “traditional” 0.23
Republican (i.e., non-Reagan nominees)
APPTSS Equals one for FRB governors nominated by a “supply-sider” 0.17
(i.e., Reagan nominees)
ADEMDEM Equals one for FRB governors nominated by a Democrat 0.11
president and conﬁrmed by a Democrat Senate
AREPREP Equals one for FRB governors nominated by a Republican 0.10
president and conﬁrmed by a Republican Senate
ADEMREP Equals one for FRB governors nominated by a Democrat 0.02
president and conﬁrmed by a Republican Senate
AREPDEM Equals one for FRB governors nominated by a Republican 0.30
president and conﬁrmed by a Democrat Senate
ASAMEP Equals one for FRB governors nominated and conﬁrmed by 0.21
the same party
Source: various issues of the Federal Reserve Bulletin.
Table 4. Independent Variables—Oversight
Variable Description Mean
OVERDEM Equals one for each year in which Democrats controlled 0.35
the presidency
OVERREP Equals one for each year in which Republicans controlled 0.65
the presidency
ODEMDEM Equals one for each year in which Democrats controlled both 0.24
the presidency and Senate
OREPREP Equals one for each year in which Republicans controlled both 0.25
the presidency and Senate
ODEMREP Equals one for each year in which Democrats controlled 0.12
the presidency and Republicans controlled the Senate
OREPDEM Equals one for each year in which Republicans controlled 0.40
the presidency and Democrats controlled the Senate
OSAMEP Equals one for each year in which the same party controlled 0.48
the presidency and Senate
Sources: Caporale and Grier, 1998; Nelson, 1993.
Table 5. Independent Variable—Inﬂation
Variable Description Mean SD Max Min
LAGINFL The annualized inﬂation rate measured 5.0% 3.6% 14.4% −1 2%
in December of year t−1.
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis at http://www.stls.frb.org/fred/data/cpi/cpilfesl.Does Partisan Heritage Matter? 501
the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) problem appears insigniﬁ-
cant for the present application. I thus employ the multinomial logit model
to estimate Equation (3) when yit is the polychotomous dependent variable.
The relationship f in Equation (3) can also be nonlinear under my contin-
uous dependent variable (i.e., voting score). Equations (1.1)–(1.3) imply that
changes in FOMC member ideal points are observable only for relatively
large changes in political inﬂuence. Under these conditions, changes in the
regressors induce smaller changes in observed voting scores than in “true”
voting scores. If such frictions are statistically large, then estimating Equa-
tion (3) via the conventional least-squares dummy variable (LSDV) model
returns deﬂated parameter estimates.
I address this difﬁculty by assuming that Rosett’s model of friction gen-
erated the FOMC voting data.
25 Estimates from this piecewise linear model
are valid when the dependent variable responds only to “large” values of the
independent variables (Maddala, 1983:162).
26 Equations (1.1)–(1.3) imply
exactly this pattern of responsiveness for the variable voting score.
4.4 Empirical Results
My empirical results appear robust in at least two respects. First, when I
ignore the potential for the president and Senate to jointly inﬂuence mone-
tary policy, I can re-create important results from the literature. In particular,
I can reproduce evidence that FRB governors prefer looser policy than do dis-
trict bank presidents, Democrat appointees prefer looser policy than do their
Republican counterparts, and “supply-side” Republicans prefer looser policy
than do “traditional” Republicans.
27  28 I report this evidence in Table 6.
25. In the appendix, I present LSDV estimates that correspond to those reported in Tables
6 and 7. While the LSDV estimates appear to be biased downward (as they would be if f
in Equation (3) is piecewise linear), inferences that can be drawn from them are qualitatively
similar to those from estimates of Rosett’s model.
26. The likelihood function for Rosett’s model of friction is L  1   2      = 
1
1
     y+ 1 −  x /  ×





     y +  2 −
  x /  , where   1   2  denotes the interval over which the dependent variable is unobservable
(i.e., the interval over which FOMC members do not dissent even though the proposed policy
directive does not coincide with their ideal points). The product in the likelihood function is
over sets of observations for which the true voting score is less than  1, greater than  1 but
less than  2, and greater than  2, respectively (Maddala, 1983:163–4).
27. In addition, estimates reported for speciﬁcations 1–3 are inconsistent with political agents
exerting signiﬁcant inﬂuence via oversight. Chappell, Havrilesky, and McGregor (1993) present
qualitatively similar evidence.
28. Coefﬁcient estimates on LAGINFLN are signiﬁcant and positive in each reported speci-
ﬁcation. Note, however, that the magnitudes are relatively small. In addition, the inference that
can be drawn from estimates on LAGINFLN is not robust to alternative measures of economic
activity (e.g., the Fed funds rate, unemployment rate, government expenditures, and GDP). In
unreported regressions, each of these alternatives exhibits a statistically insigniﬁcant relation-
ship with voting score while leaving inference that can be drawn from estimates on the political
variables unchanged. The relative insigniﬁcance of LAGINFLN, as well as its lack of robust-
ness, would result under Equations (1.1)–(1.3) if FOMC members responded in a homogeneous
manner to changes in economic data. Results from unreported regressions in which I apply a502 The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, V18 N2
Table 6. Reproducing Qualitative Results from the Literature—Dependent Variable is
Voting Score
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
CONSTANT(1) 10 07 7 66 9 94 7 58 13 15 8 01∗
CONSTANT(2) 10 56 7 67 10 42 7 59 13 63 8 02∗
APPTFRB −0 19 0 05∗∗∗
APPTDEM −0 31 0 08∗∗∗ −0 30 0 08∗∗∗
APPTREP −0 16 0 05∗∗∗
APPTREP2 −0 12 0 05∗∗
APPTSS −0 21 0 06∗∗∗
OVERDEM 0 04 0 04 0 05 0 04 0 03 0 04
LAGINFLN 0 01 0 01∗∗ 0 02 0 01∗∗ 0 02 0 01∗∗
YEAR 0 01 0 00 0 01 0 00 0 01 0 00∗
Log likelihood −157 94 −155 10 −154 07
Avg. log likelihood −0 61 −0 60 −0 59
Akaike info criterion 1 27 1 26 1 26
Schwarz criterion 1 37 1 37 1 38
N 259 259 259
∗Signiﬁcant at the 90% conﬁdence level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 95% conﬁdence level.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 99% conﬁdence level.
My results also appear robust in that inference from my dependent vari-
ables voting score and group is qualitatively identical—partisan heritage
doesn’t matter, but inﬂuence is stronger when the same party controls the
presidency and Senate. This inference can be drawn, for example, from
results reported in Table 7 where the dependent variable is voting score and
parameters are estimated using Rosett’s model of friction.
To generate these estimates, I permit the president and Senate to jointly
inﬂuence monetary policy. In particular, to estimate Speciﬁcation (4)’s param-
eters, I control for the potential that appointment and oversight forces vary
across combinations of presidential and Senate parties. Consequently this
speciﬁcation explains signiﬁcantly more variance in FOMC voting than do
those reported in Table 6.
29
Moreover, results from Speciﬁcation (4) are consistent with political
agents exercising signiﬁcantly greater inﬂuence when the same party con-
trols both the presidency and Senate.
30 For example, FOMC members who
Box-Cox transformation to the non-dummy-variable regressors (i.e., LAGINFLN and YEAR)
are consistent with this type of response. Hibbs (1986:69) offers qualitatively similar evidence.
29. For any speciﬁcation reported in Tables 6 and 7, the hypothesis that “ignoring interac-
tion effects impairs the model’s explanatory capability” can be accepted with more than 95%
conﬁdence.
30. As an additional precaution against omitted variable bias, and thus against the potential
to overstate the present results, I attempt to control for the inﬂuence of individual Fed chairs.
In particular, I add a set of “chair dummies” to each set of regressors reported in Table 7
(e.g., CHAIR BURNS equals one for the years in which Arthur Burns chaired the FOMC).Does Partisan Heritage Matter? 503
Table 7. Parameter Estimates with Joint Inﬂuence—Dependent Variable is Voting Score
(4) (5)
Variable Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
CONSTANT(1) 18 47 8 25∗∗ 12 98 7 40∗
CONSTANT(2) 18 95 8 27∗∗ 13 46 7 41∗
ASAMEP −0 21 0 05∗∗∗
ADEMDEM −0 31 0 08∗∗∗
AREPREP −0 35 0 07∗∗∗
ADEMREP −0 21 0 22
AREPDEM −0 10 0 05∗∗
APPTDIST 0 11 0 05∗∗
OSAMEP 0 08 0 04∗∗
ODEMDEM 0 18 0 11∗
OREPREP 0 16 0 11
OREPDEM 0 11 0 11
LAGINFLN 0 01 0 01∗ 0 01 0 01∗∗
YEAR 0 01 0 00∗∗ 0 01 0 00∗
Log likelihood −147 35 −149 25
Avg. log likelihood −0 57 −0 58
Akaike info criterion 1 23 1 21
Schwarz criterion 1 40 1 32
N 259 259
∗Signiﬁcant at the 90% conﬁdence level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 95% conﬁdence level.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 99% conﬁdence level.
were nominated and conﬁrmed by the same party (i.e., members for whom
ADEMDEM or AREPREP equals one) dissented more than 30% more fre-
quently for looser policy, ceteris paribus, than did district bank presidents.
31
In unreported regressions, coefﬁcient estimates on each of the chair dummies is statistically
insigniﬁcant. In other words, voting behavior of FOMC members does not appear to vary sig-
niﬁcantly, ceteris paribus, across Fed chairs. Chappell, Havrilesky, and McGregor (1993) offer
qualitatively similar evidence. This evidence is not, however, inconsistent with oversight acting
through the Fed chair.
31. For the sample period 1973–1997, AREPREP equals one only during the Reagan pres-
idency (i.e., from 01/05/81 to 01/06/87). Hence, interpreting the associated parameter estimate
as a “same party” effect may be inappropriate. To address this potential difﬁculty, I include
dummies in an unreported regression that equal one for each president-Senate combination
(e.g., REAGAN-REP equals one for FRB governors nominated by Reagan and conﬁrmed by a
Republican Senate, while REAGAN-DEM equals one for FRB governors nominated by Rea-
gan and conﬁrmed by a Democratic Senate). Estimates from this speciﬁcation are consistent
with governors nominated by Reagan and conﬁrmed by a Republican Senate (i.e., governors for
whom AREPREP equals one) dissenting for looser monetary policy signiﬁcantly more frequently
than governors nominated by Reagan and conﬁrmed by a Democratic Senate (i.e., governors for
whom AREPDEM equals one). In this light, coefﬁcient estimates on AREPREP appear to reﬂect
a “same party” effect as opposed to a “Reagan” or “supply-side” effect. In addition, estimated
coefﬁcients on the variables CARTER-DEM, REAGAN-REP, and CLINTON-DEM (i.e., vari-
ables that account for about 91% of the governors who were nominated and conﬁrmed by the
same party) are statistically indistinguishable and the most negative of estimated appointment
coefﬁcients.504 The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, V18 N2
They also dissented signiﬁcantly more for looser policy than did FRB
governors who were nominated and conﬁrmed by the different parties (i.e.,
members for whom ADEMREP or AREPDEM equals one).
32 Interpreted in
light of Proposition 1, these estimates are consistent with political agents
appointing signiﬁcantly looser governors when the same party controls the
presidency and Senate.
Rather than varying systematically across parties, political inﬂuence
appears to follow here from (i) a common incentive to loosen policy and (ii)
a lower cost to pursue this incentive when parties are aligned. This conjecture
ﬁnds additional support in estimates of Speciﬁcation (5). To generate these
estimates, I explicitly impose coefﬁcient restrictions that are evident from
Speciﬁcation (4)’s results. In particular, I assume that appointment forces
are constant across FRB governors who were nominated and conﬁrmed by
the same party. I also assume that oversight forces are constant across years
in which the same party controlled both the presidency and Senate.
33
Under this speciﬁcation, FRB governors who were nominated and con-
ﬁrmed by the same party dissented for looser policy more than 20% more
frequently than did governors who were nominated and conﬁrmed by dif-
ferent parties. Similarly, FOMC members who served when the same party
controlled both the presidency and Senate dissented for tighter policy about
8% more frequently than when party control was split. In light of Propo-
sitions 1 and 2, these results are consistent with political agents attempting
to loosen policy signiﬁcantly more frequently when agents from either party
are aligned. Moreover, this speciﬁcation has greater explanatory ability than
does any reported in Tables 6 and 7.
34
Qualitatively identical evidence emerges when I replace the continuous
dependent variable voting score with the polychotomous variable group.
35
For example, the probability of dissenting for looser policy is signiﬁcantly
greater for FRB governors who were nominated and conﬁrmed by agents
from the same party than for other FOMC members. Table 8 summarizes
this evidence.
36
32. The signiﬁcant and negative coefﬁcient estimate on AREPDEM is not inconsistent with
political agents exercising signiﬁcantly greater appointment inﬂuence when the same party con-
trols the presidency and Senate. This inference might be valid if the magnitude of AREP-
DEM’s coefﬁcient estimate was statistically indistinguishable from those on AREPREP and
ADEMDEM. It is not. Rather, it is consistent with governors who were appointed by Republi-
can presidents and Democratic Senates preferring looser policy than do district bank presidents,
but tighter policy than do same-party appointees.
33. Neither of these hypotheses can be rejected at reasonable levels of conﬁdence.
34. While this speciﬁcation does not maximize the likelihood function across reported spec-
iﬁcations, it does have the greatest explanatory power with respect to the Akaike information
and Schwarz criteria.
35. To generate this evidence, I populate Equation (3) with Speciﬁcation (5)’s regressors (see
Table 7) and estimate the parameters using the multinomial logit model.
36. I calculate these probabilities at the mean level of inﬂation (i.e., 4.97) and year (i.e.,
1985) when the variable OSAMEP equals zero (i.e., when the overseeing president’s party
differs from that of the overseeing Senate).Does Partisan Heritage Matter? 505
Table 8. Dissent Probabilities—Appointments
FRB governor nominated FRB governor nominated
and conﬁrmed by and conﬁrmed by District bank
same party different parties president
Prob(dissent for 0.44 0.20 0.05
looser policy)
Prob(dissent for 0.02 0.13 0.25
tighter policy)
Similarly, the probability of dissenting for tighter policy is signiﬁcantly
greater when the same party controls the presidency and Senate. Like that
reported in Table 7, this evidence is consistent with overseers from both parties
preferring relatively loose policy and pursuing this preference more effectively
when they are from the same party. Table 9 summarizes this evidence.
In addition to being consistent with overseers from both parties pursu-
ing signiﬁcantly looser policy when parties are aligned, evidence reported in
Table 9 suggests that oversight does not act uniformly across FOMC mem-
bers. To see this, notice that FRB governors who were nominated and con-
ﬁrmed by different parties have about a 10% greater probability of dissenting
for tighter policy when overseers’ parties are aligned (i.e., 0.23 versus 0.13)
and district bank presidents have almost a 15% greater probability (i.e., 0.40
versus 0.25). Interpreted in light of Proposition 2, this evidence suggests that
overseers induce signiﬁcantly looser policy when their parties are aligned,
but do so by leaving the ideal points of district bank presidents and FRB
governors who were nominated and conﬁrmed by different parties relatively
unchanged.
37 In other words, individuals who were nominated and conﬁrmed
by the same party appear subject to signiﬁcantly greater inﬂuence via both
appointments and oversight.
4.5 Summary
Contributors to the literature tend to argue that variation in appointer and
overseer preferences causes variation in monetary policy. When I follow the
literature by ignoring interactions between the president and Senate, I too
ﬁnd evidence for these arguments. When I control for the joint inﬂuence of
presidents and Senates, however, the resulting evidence is consistent with
party alignment reducing the cost for political agents to pursue a common
incentive. This cost reduction may be due to the relatively rich set of punish-
ment strategies available to agents from the same party. When these strategies
are not feasible, as may be the case when agents come from different parties,
37. Received positive results regarding oversight’s effectiveness (e.g., Caporale and Grier,
1998) are drawn from time-series data and thus cannot identify how oversight might elicit
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cooperative outcomes may not be sustainable even though agents’ preferences
point in the same direction.
38
5. Conclusion
The Federal Reserve System is a relatively insulated bureaucracy. Neverthe-
less, at least two channels remain through which political agents can exert
pressure: appointments and oversight. Contributors to the relevant literature
disagree about which channel carries more force, but tend to agree that any
such force has a partisan heritage.
Why has this essentially preference-based explanation been so inﬂuential
in the present context when social scientists have long been critical of such
explanations in general (e.g., see Becker, 1976)? One reason may be its
apparent robustness—after all, I can re-create evidence from the present data
and methods that partisan heritage matters. Another may be, as Caporale and
Grier (1998) argue, that preference-based explanations have predictive value.
I would argue from the present evidence that these apparent virtues are
ephemeral and have heretofore dissuaded scholars from investigating deeper
and sometimes unintuitive implications of a fundamental political force;
namely, the inability for individuals, acting collectively, to efﬁciently pursue
their common interests. From this perspective, the partisan heritage model
appears to be a description, as opposed to an explanation, of fundamental
forces that shape our empirical reality.
The manner in which Reagan nominees have heretofore been treated is
illustrative. These nominees frequently dissent for looser policy in both
the present data and those evaluated in the literature (e.g., see Chappell,
Havrilesky, and McGregor, 1993). Scholars have rationalized this exceptional
behavior by attributing it to systematic variation in Republican preferences
(i.e., supply-siders prefer looser policy than do “traditional” Republicans).
If Reagan nominees reﬂect a systematic pattern of within-party prefer-
ence heterogeneity, however, then the estimated inﬂuence of appointments
and oversight should vary only with changes in the executive, not the par-
tisan alignment of executives and Senates. Nevertheless, observations where
Reagan appointees dissent for looser monetary policy are not distributed uni-
formly across Reagan’s terms. Rather they are concentrated in Reagan’s ﬁrst
six years; that is, years in which Republicans formally controlled the pres-
idency and Senate. Interpreted in this light, the present data are consistent
with political agents, regardless of party, having homogeneous preferences
over monetary policy and differences in observed inﬂuence emanating from
38. If party members incur lower costs to punish others in their own party, then within-party
collective action costs will be relatively low. Beck et al. (1999) and Henisz (2000) exploit this
hypothesis to measure the magnitude of political constraints across countries. Henisz (2000),
Stasavage (2000), and Falaschetti (2001) offer evidence that these measures indeed reﬂect the
cost for political agents to act collectively.508 The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, V18 N2
changes in the costs for associated individuals to act collectively on these
preferences.
39
This cost-based explanation maintains the qualities that have heretofore
been attributed to preference-based explanations: it’s robust and facilitates
prediction. In addition, it explains signiﬁcantly more variation in the present
data and identiﬁes more precisely the channels through which oversight inﬂu-
ences monetary policy. Interpreted in this light, the present research appears
to improve our understanding of how political forces inﬂuence an important
policy domain.
Appendix: LSDV Estimates
Table A1. LSDV Estimates of Speciﬁcations Presented in Table 6
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
CONSTANT −3 57 2 54 −3 51 2 52 −5 89 2 68∗∗
APPTFRB −0 07 0 02∗∗∗
APPTDEM −0 12 0 02∗∗∗ −0 11 0 02∗∗∗
APPTREP −0 06 0 02∗∗∗
APPTREP2 −0 03 0 02
APPTSS −0 10 0 03∗∗∗
OVERDEM 0 02 0 02 0 02 0 02 0 01 0 02
LAGINFLN 0 01 0 00 0 01 0 00∗ 0 01 0 00∗
YEAR 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00∗∗
R2 0 07 0 08 0 10
Adj. R2 0 05 0 07 0 07
F-statistic 4 72 4 62 4 73
Prob(F-stat) 0 00 0 00 0 00
∗Signiﬁcant at the 90% conﬁdence level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 95% conﬁdence level.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 99% conﬁdence level.
39. This evidence might also be interpreted as reﬂecting the ability of presidents to “stack
the FRB” late in their terms—dissents might become less frequent as a president’s tenure grows
and the board becomes more concentrated with his nominations. I control for this potential in
unreported regressions by including the variable TERM2 as a regressor. TERM2 equals one for
years in which the president was in his second term and zero otherwise. Inference that can be
drawn from regressions that include this variable do not differ qualitatively from those reported
in the present article. I thank Chip Chappell for bringing this issue to my attention.Does Partisan Heritage Matter? 509
Table A2. LSDV Estimates of Speciﬁcations Presented in Table 7
(4) (5)
Variable Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
CONSTANT −7 03 2 76∗∗ −4 79 2 32∗∗
ADEMDEM −0 12 0 03∗∗∗
AREPREP −0 16 0 04∗∗∗
ADEMREP −0 07 0 04∗∗
AREPDEM −0 03 0 02
ASAMEP −0 11 0 03∗∗∗
APPTDIST 0 03 0 02
ODEMDEM 0 07 0 03∗∗
OREPREP 0 07 0 04∗∗
OREPDEM 0 04 0 03∗
OSAMEP 0 04 0 02∗∗
LAGINFLN 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00
YEAR 0 00 0 00∗∗ 0 00 0 00∗
R2 0 14 0 13
Adj. R2 0 11 0 12
F-statistic 4 63 7 88
Prob(F-stat) 0 00 0 00
∗Signiﬁcant at the 90% conﬁdence level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 95% conﬁdence level.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 99% conﬁdence level.
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